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Abstract: Ofgrowing debate among those concerned with American political culture and
democratic theory is the modern conception ofliberal democratic theory. This work
attempts to broaden our understanding ofdemocracy. I will argue that modern
liberalism has narrowed our conception ofindividual liberty. This narrowedfocus has
produce a reliance on the use ofpublic regulation and interest group pressure as
substitutes for civic engagement. In an attempt to move past a mere critique ofnarrow
liberalism, this essay will develop a research design and an empirical test to measure our
current political culture's support for a robust democracy and its future prospects of
development.
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Beyond Narrow Liberalism
Introduction

The year 1965 was one of milestones and victories for liberal democratic ideals.
Hailed as a centerpiece of the civil rights movement, the 1965 Voting Rights Act
accomplished an essential step in the evolution of democracy and justice. This
procedural reform sought to ensure individual rights and liberties through the inclusion of
minority voice in the political process. For those who fought and died, this national level
guarantee of political voice and power was designed to ensure equality and freedom
under uniform laws for all citizens. This was a great achievement which re-focused our
country on the goal of a more equal and just society. However, the act neglected an
equally important reason for this reform: the engendering of civic participation and
meaning. Liberalism has pushed individual freedoms and equality to new understandings
but has ignored the equally important role of civics in our democracy. An essential
normative claim of this essay is the requirement of continuous input and oversight by
"the people" in order for democracy to make the virtuous claim of self-government and
the civic improvement of its citizens. Modem liberalism narrowed our understanding of
democracy. It excluded the formative role of participation in the pursuit of individual
rights.
Liberalism and democratic theory in general depend on the three fundamental
pillars of self-government for their foundation: individual freedom, public regulation, and
civic meaning. Liberalism in the last fifty years has focused on the first of those pillars,
using the second as a crutch, at the expense of the third. This is not a new observation;
many authors have identified the tension liberalism has produced in modem democracy
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in different ways. Theodore 1. Lowi's analysis of the "second republic" in American
history characterized by the explosion of bureaucracy explores the far-reaching effects of
a liberalism narrowed to a focus on regulative bureaucracy (Lowi, 1979). Lowi's
"interest group liberalism" took the path of least resistance--it increased individual
freedoms and government responsiveness through pluralistic access to regulative
bureaucracy instead of engendering change in the hearts and minds of the citizenry.
As Stephan Holmes argued in his work, Passions and Constraints, traditional
liberal democratic theory had a heavy dose of positive consitutionalism. Constitutions, as
early liberals envisioned, not only limit government power to ensure individual freedom
(negative constitutionalism). But they also establish structures that, "can ensure that the
will of the people is formed through open public debate ... [and] can enhance the
intelligence and legitimacy of decisions made" (positive constitutionalism), (Holmes,
1995:8). According to Holmes, traditional liberalism both assumes and requires the
engendering of participation and active individual engagement to counter regulatory
power. In the end Holmes states that, "liberalism is a necessary, though not sufficient,
condition for some measure of democracy in any modem state" (Holmes, 1989:9). In
what he suggests is a co-existence, liberalism allows for and assumes republican concepts
and participation.
James Morone in his work, The Democratic Wish, identifies the "dread and
yearning" of the American people (Morone, 1991). The dread of government, stems
from "the perception that public power threatens civic liberty" (Morone, 1991 :2). The
conflicting yearnings of the American people comprise the democratic wish. Key to the
democratic wish, "is an image of the people-a single, united, political entity with the
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capacity, as John Adams put it, to 'think, feel, reason, and act'" (Morone, 1991:5). The
American people have always assumed and strived for active participation according to
Morone. The American ideology, as he terms it, is based on self-government, meaning
active popular participation to prevent government action without the consent of the
people. However, a stronger yearning, individualism, has allowed the American people
to be deluded into thinking the expansion of government is their own will and is actually
protecting their desire to ensure self-government. Morone's portrait of democracy's
development in America ends in a disheartening conclusion.
The state and its bureaucracy grew; however, they never won a legitimate
role at the center of our society. Instead, two centuries of state building
produced a string of metaphoricallegitimators for public administration: a
mirror of the people (as the revolutionaries fancied their assemblies), a
reflection of the people's choices (Jacksonians), the computation of
disinterested science (Progressives), the outcome of the pluralistic political
market (some New Dealers). Each formula was an effort to rest
administrative authority on an external, automatically functioning source
oflegitimacy. Each was a different escape from the same threat-public
officials who make independent judgements, ministers who think.
(Morone, 1991:323)
Morone argues that a republican yearning has existed throughout our history but that the
yearning to be unencumbered has prevailed in shaping our democracy. I would argue
that, while this may be the case to limited degrees, it simply reflects the logical balancing
of republican participatory ideals and individual freedoms in earlier periods. Only in the
twentieth century has this delusion that bureaucracy can be an effective substitute for
participation become hegemonic.
Michael Sandel's analysis of the American public philosophy supports the above
assertion. In his work, Democracy's Discontent, he defines the modern manifestation of
liberalism as one that "asserts the priority of fair procedures over particular ends, the
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public life it infonns might be call the procedural republic" (Sandel, 1996:4). Several
key points and ideas are argued from this definition. The first is that "freedom consists in
the capacity of persons to choose their values and ends" (Sandel, 1996:5). Sandel tenns
this the priority of the right over the good. This means that our right to choose our own
good trumps any controlling collective good. There is no common conception of the good
life. Virtue comes in allowing citizens to choose their own ends. The second major point
to be made from Sandel's definition is the implied neutrality ofthe state. In his
procedural republic, the state does not perfonn any fonnative function. Lowi's second
republic, Holmes's negative constitutionalism, and Morone's self-delusion are different
conceptions of very similar arguments. The explosion of bureaucracy has insulated the
people from their government and de-emphasized civic participation.
An essential flaw in Sandel and other critics ofliberalism is their juxtaposition of

liberalism to republicanism. Republicanism is not in opposition to liberalism. As some
have suggested these two public philosophies combine and rely on each other to maintain
self-government. Richard Dagger for example argues that, "just as a liberal society must
be able to count on a sense of community and civic engagement, so the republican polity
that Sandel now champions must be able to count on a commitment to liberal principles,
such as tolerance, fair play, and respect for others" (Dagger, 1998:4). Democracy relies
on both philosophies for development and regime support. Without both sides of the
equation, democracy can be undercut. Narrow liberalism has de-emphasized, but not
destroyed, republicanism. A resurgence of republicanism should not attempt to discredit
a commitment to a broader liberal theory.
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"Central to republican theory is the idea that liberty depends on sharing in self
government ... sharing in self-rule involves ... deliberating with fellow citizens about
the common good and helping to the destiny of the political community" (Sandel,
1996:5). Sandel misunderstood the implications of his own definition of republicanism.
This definition does not demand a communitarian model, where the common good has
priority over individual rights. Nor does this definition demand republicanism be set in
opposition to liberalism. As Richard Dagger points out in his critique of Sandel, "we
should pause to consider whether republicanism and liberalism share enough features to
make a hybrid possible-perhaps in the form of a 'more civic-minded liberalism' that
might be called republican liberalism" (Dagger, 1998:26). While Dagger seeks to find a
hybrid, I contend the relationship should be conceptualized more as a necessary co
existence. Republicanism and liberalism are distinct schools of democratic thought
which cannot be combined into one overarching theory. Yet, in the practical application
of democracy on a society, each requires the other for foundations and support. On the
one hand, liberalism relies on republican virtue to create the type of citizens required for
self-government. This, in turn, is the vehicle for individual freedom and liberties. On the
other hand, republicanism relies on liberalism's commitment to tolerance, freedom and
fairness to create ajust society. Both are necessary but not sufficient for democracy's
development.
Narrow liberalism does not allow for what Sandel terms "a formative politics,"
(the cultivation of citizens). However, traditional liberalism accepted and relied upon the
republican idea of a non-neutral state. Holmes' argument for positive constitutionalism
not only allows for but also requires the cultivation of citizens able to and inclined to
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participate and debate. Again, Sandel confuses traditional liberalism with the narrow
implementation of the twentieth century. "The republican conception of freedom, unlike
the liberal conception, require a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the
qualities of character self-government requires" (Sandel, 1996:6). Republicanism
envisions a formative project. The cultivation of civic-minded individuals is essential to
self-government, and therefore is essential to the protection of individual rights as well as
the pursuit of the common good. Narrow liberalism's dilemma is that it has secured
rights through procedural reform instead of through societal consensus. These advances
in individual rights help us develop as individuals and as a society. We must engage in a
formative project to change the hearts and minds of our citizenry and, this cannot be done
through regulation alone. This must be done through open debate and engagement and a
formative state. The challenge is to develop new ways to engender this type of citizenry
without coercion under our new understandings of individual rights. It is not, as Sandel
states, that "the liberal vision of freedom lacks the civic resources to sustain self
government," but that the modem implementation of narrow liberalism lacks the
necessary institutional mechanisms.
As opposed to the traditional, wide-reaching ideals found in liberal thought, the
liberalism that has dominated the twentieth century has produced a society and a
government focused on achievement in only one area. The focus on individual, private
freedom has achieved great strides for the citizens ofthis country, but at what cost? An
essential piece of democracy is the civic ideal. Narrow liberalism has neglected the
importance of civic culture and instead has relied solely on procedural regulation to
maintain a government truly for the people. In the end, narrow liberalism has used
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procedural mechanisms to expand individual freedom while assuming that those
mechanisms they have created will keep government in check and lessen the need for
civic engagement.
Self-government on autopilot is the order of the day for modem liberal theory.
The reliance on regulative bureaucracy allows citizens to be concerned only with their
own private, usually economic, well-being and undermine the crucial function of civic
participation. The total de-emphasis of civic meaning and interdependence will not lead
to a total destruction of democracy and free will. It will, however, prevent society's
advance toward a more just and morally virtuous society. The normative argument thus
leads to an empirical claim. The goal of this essay is to clarify the normative issues in
order to shape our understanding of the tangible impact of narrow liberalism on our
democracy. To fully understand this somewhat meandering line of logic, several basic
assumptions and definitions must be established. What follows is a discussion on
democracy, self-government, concepts of development and, in the end, a proposal for
measuring civic culture values concretely in terms of democratic institutions, actions, and
norms.

I. The Pillars of Self-Government

Any attempt to move beyond our current state and develop our democracy into a
more just and virtuous milieu for individual growth and freedom requires an analysis of
the pillars of self-government and how they affect future development. I have identified
three broad categories: public regulation, civic meaning, and individual liberty. These
pillars of self-government provide the foundation of democracy and its development. A
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regulative body checking the government and providing the structures for participation;
civic meaning and the sense of community, nation and personal relevance it creates; and
private individual freedoms and autonomy comprise those fundamental pillars of self
government. Each of these pillars, in distinctive ways, adds to the development of
democracy. They are also interdependent. Public regulation is an unavoidable result of
government of any kind, and it is a very virtuous product when under control and in the
hands of the people. Without regulative bureaucracy, a society cannot institutionalize
ways to protect and engender civic meaning or individual liberty. Civic meaning, our
sense of whom we are in relation to those around us, is undermined in the absence of
individual liberties. Without the production of civic meaning, individual freedom loses
some of its virtue and may become undermined as well.
James Morone was correct in as much as democracy necessarily creates
bureaucracy as a vehicle of regulation (Morone, 1990). Self-government is still a
government. Governments are administrative and bureaucratic in nature. The concern is
to what purpose the bureaucracy exists. Is it there as an arm of a dictator's repressive
regime? To collect a monarch's tribute? To carry out national interest group demands?
Or is the purpose of bureaucracy to implement the will of the people and protect the
agreed concepts of society; e.g. freedom, justice, and equality? In the case of self
government, the type of regulation created performs two essential functions: not only
does it address and protect private interests, but it also acts as a public check.
Stephan Holmes identifies constitutionalism as the key regulative actor in limiting
a government's power and shaping our society (Holmes, 1995). For Holmes,
constitutions perform both a restrictive and facilitative function. Liberalism of the
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twentieth century has embraced "the doctrine that constitutions are primarily preventative
or inhibitory devices, meant to check or repress tyranny and other abuses of power"
(Holmes, 1995:7). No doubt this is true and a very necessary role for constitutions and
the regulative elements of democracy in general. However, the unquestioned focus
merely on restriction has led to an acceptance on an ever-increasing regulative body.
This body has grown far past constitutional limits and concepts. Bureaucratic agents are
now given the tools of power to define societal norms, set standards, and determine
governmental bounds on private life without ever receiving one vote. As a pillar of self
government, regulative bodies must not only check government power, but also perform
the facilitative role of structuring institutions to promote and channel public debate into
the policy making process. Unlike constitutional-level institutions, the current system is
tied to interest group pluralism and therefore cannot accomplish this. The reformers of
the 1960s attempted to engage the public within the framework of the current system and
only produced further bureaucratic insulation from individual debate and discussion and .
an even greater focus on national interest groups (Harris and Milkis, 1989).
Self-government produces a higher meaning for the citizen. This more virtuous
meaning is a product of self-government's requirement of participation. Virtue is
increased by shifting the focus from one's own position to a focus on one's contribution
to the making ofajust and virtuous society. Citizens' moral virtue is increased by their
awareness of and concerned for those around them. "More than a scheme for majority
rule or individual liberty or equal rights, democracy had as its highest purpose the moral
and civic improvement of the people" (Sandel, 1996:220). As Sandel and others argue
with success, the modem liberal notion of unencumbered or bracketed selves is
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unachievable and undesirable. We are partially defined by our encumbrances, and as
such, it is important to realize that we must accept responsibility to engage in self
government in order to improve our personal virtue. Self-government produces higher
civic virtue and individual meaning through its requirement of participation and
engagement in the search for a just and virtuous society.
The third pillar of self-government is individual liberty. Each individual's
freedom and autonomy stems directly from self-government's commitments and ends.
Individuals are free because they engage in and have an effect on their government. By
voting, debating and contributing to democracy, we free individuals to pursue "the good
life" in whatever shape we envision. This pillar of self-government has been the sole
focus and desire of narrow liberalism. While essential and virtuous, the production of
individual freedom as defined by modem liberals has mutated our system's regulative
structures and powers and has de-emphasized and undermined the production of civic
meaning. A broadening of our understanding of democracy and all its essential
characteristics is required.

II. The Surface Characteristics of Democracy
Democracy has been stated simply and in seemingly un-mistakable terms.
Abraham Lincoln's oft quoted assertion, "government of the people, by the people, and
for the people," seems to suggest what any fourth grader would tell you: democracy is
simply free government, based on the sovereignty ofthe people, advancing the will ofthe
people. This type of government can be easily distinguished from non-democratic forms.
Clear and unmistakable characteristics define a democracy, but only describe democracy
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at the surface. These surface characteristics are important and necessary to democracy's
foundation, but do not guarantee a robust version of self-government capable of
producing virtuous citizens. In fact, the four surface characteristics are termed such
because they are only products of the first two pillars of democracy, individual freedom
and public regulation. A democracy based only on two legs cannot stand. The third
pillar of democracy, civic meaning, produces more subtle characteristics of democracy,
which I term foundational characteristics. This distinction will shape the development of
the empirical claim of the essay and lead to a research design.
Elections are the most readily measured surface characteristic of democracy.
Along with other structural mechanisms, elections are designed to ensure representation,
both in the legislative assembly and in policy outputs. To be a truly democratic influence
on policy-makers, elections must be structured to ensure a wide definition of those who
are qualified to vote. This is for democratic legitimacy and to ensure that representative
government is indeed, representative. The great success of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
was that it widened the electorate. But even with this seemingly clear characteristic,
some distinctions and explanations must be made. Democratic theorists have debated two
elements or conceptions of the role of elections. I will present these as the idealist
version and the realist version of elections. Joseph Schumpeter articulates the realist
position: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1997:366). Elections simply serve as a
check on those in power, but only in so far as they allow "the people" to choose which set
of elites will govern. According to Schumpeter, idealists ignore the essential role of
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elections as tools for selection of leaders. True government by the people is unattainable
and impractical. Democratic theory is moving toward this new realization. The idealists
contend that free and open elections are part of the essential process of debate and
discussion. Elections are not designed to give the populous direct control over policy;
they are principally designed to translate the doctrine of popular sovereignty into an
operating principle or institutional practice (Mayo, 1997:372). Elections are obvious and
essential points in the process of self-government by which the will of "the people" is
measured. For idealists (and I count my self as one), elections also point to a deeper role
and value in democracy. They not only allow Schumpeter's "throwing the bums out" but
also ensure that those in power listen to public debate and govern accordingly in between
elections. Ifrepresentatives fail in this task, they risk the same fate as those they
replaced.
Another surface characteristic of democracy is a commitment to freedoms, both
political and individua1. Political freedom refers to the ability to freely choose a
representative body. Voters must be allowed to make their own decision without
coercion or intimidation. Essential to this process is the existence of formal rules such as
secret ballot, freedom to run for office, freedom of press and speech, and freedom to
assemble and organize for political purposes (Mayo 1997:374). The legitimate operation
and inclusion of opposition parties and opinions is a measure a government's
commitment to democracy. Governments such as the former Soviet Union, Communist
China, and the hegemonic PRI in Mexico display all the trappings of democratic
elections, but these are only cosmetic. Preordained election results and the lack of any
viable opposition sweep away any claim to democracy. Fundamental to democracy's
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effectiveness and stability is a commitment to the maintenance of individual freedoms.
Rights of privacy, religion, basic education, and economic self-determination are just
some of the rights demanded. The protection of individual rights maintains and
engenders popular support for the regime and a sense of government working to protect
each citizen. This understanding of rights is part of what Richard Wilson calls
"compliance ideologies": those standards and norms, decided on by society, and ensured
by the government, which protect and stabilize the current political structure (Wilson,
1992).
Commitment to political and social equality is also a necessary trademark of
modem democracy. This distinction parallels democracy's commitment to freedoms.
Political equality refers to electoral structure and outcomes. For political equality to be
achieved each citizen shall have one vote, each vote shall count equally and the
representatives elected shall be proportional to the number of equal votes (Mayo
1997:372). Political equality ensures legitimacy and translates popular sovereignty into,
structural outcomes. Social equality is measured through the policy outcomes but is
achieved through wide popular consensus. This implies another problem with narrow
liberalism: modem liberals measure success or progress in procedural reforms rather than
societal attitudes and norms. The assumption is that government can produce mass
attitudinal change through regulation. If democracy's highest purpose is the civic
improvement of citizens and this is accomplished through individual participation and
engagement, a theory as to how society as a whole improves is implied. A basic
argument of this work is that social attitudes are altered one person at a time and not by
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centralized regulation. But at this juncture, it is important to note that modern democracy
must display a commitment both to political equality and to social equality.
Majoritarianism is the fourth surface characteristic. It presents an internal
tension, which must also be addressed in any attempt to define democratic structure.
Democracy's claim to representation is seemingly at odds with the notions of majority
rule. Some argue that, ifthe will of the majority prevails, those in the minority are not
represented in policy. As Schumpeter put it, "the will of the majority is the will of the
majority and not the will of 'the people, '" (Schumpeter, 1997:368). But this does not
necessarily exclude the claim of government "by the people." As MacIver, Mayo,
Lindsay and others have argued, democracy is not a form of policy development; it is a
system to determine who governs and to what ends (Cohen, 1997). Many consider
majoritarian aspects of democracy beneficial and stabilizing when counter-balanced with
a society wide commitment to minority rights. The very fact that the majority prevails
when universal consensus cannot be achieved, which is almost always the case, only
ensures democracy's survival and continued mass support ofthe government structure. It
is important to note that this is not a carte blanche for Tocqueville's feared "tyranny of
the majority." In the end this benefits all society members by maintaining egalitarian
aspects and structural opportunities for minorities, while maintaining stability and long
term support.
The surface characteristics of democracy display the important products of the
first and second pillars of democracy. However, they also point to their own inability to
ensure and protect the third pillar of democracy, civic meaning. Elections are designed to
begin the process oftranslating popular sovereignty into an operating principle but cannot
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alone create a virtuous society or virtuous citizens; this requires a more personal and
continuous participation. Commitments to freedom and equality are both essential
products in structuring a virtuous society but cannot alone encourage the engagement of
citizens in the formation of community. Much like the first three, majoritarianism
provides necessary stability and regime support but does not, in itself, engage citizens in
the formative project. To produce civic meaning and virtue in society, we tum to the
foundational characteristics of democracy.

III. The Foundational Characteristics of Democracy

Democratic theorists have been struggling for centuries with the notions of
participation and community ends, both of which are essential products of democracy and
its future progress. These foundational characteristics form a symbiotic relationship with
the third pillar of self-government, civic meaning. Participation and community are at
once the results and causes of civic meaning. Individual level engagement presupposes,
consent. By debating, citizens contribute to the polity and thus consent to societal norms
and structures. This process of contributing to the formation of norms is the mechanism
for civic improvement. Civic meaning enables the cultivation of citizens and a
commitment to broader, community-based ends. And, by tum, when a society cultivates
citizens, it produces civic meaning.
For democracy to make the virtuous claim of self-government there must be
continuous input and oversight by "the people." This is a very different claim than
modem liberal theorists have pragmatically pushed into practice. Narrow liberalism's
tunnel vision toward an expansion of individual rights and liberties has resulted in the use
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of bureaucracy and interest groups organization in place of true individual participation.
In other words, narrow liberalism has developed a system of incentives that encourages
pursuing narrow ends via interest groups. Democracy cannot stand on interest groups
and regulation alone so that, individuals may spend all of their efforts toward their own
ends. In order to develop and advance to a more virtuous kind of democracy, the
expansions in individual rights and procedural regulation must be matched in kind by a
new conception and understanding of civic meaning and new ways to engender the
formative project of cultivating citizens capable of self-government. This is a very basic
fact that liberal policy of the last fifty years has unintentionally undermined.
Even activists movements of the late 1960s and 1970s, such as the
environmentalists, were subject to the structural and cultural effects of narrow liberalism.
The environmental movement was part of a larger movement to get citizens "plugged
back into" government and policy making. However, the emphasis and tactics employed
by the environmental movement display a complete adaptation to modem liberalism's
pluralistic structure. Individual citizens and small community action groups were not
effective. Only after a national movement funding professional lobbyists in Washington
D.C. was formed did they view their work as successful. With the creation in 1970 of the
Environmental Protection Agency, environmentalists gave decision-making power to
bureaucrats, not elected officials or community groups. Many of these bureaucrats were
actually lobbyists formerly working for citizen groups who moved over to the agency
(Harris and Milkis, 1998: 225-230). They bought into narrow liberalism's reliance on
regulative bureaucracy and judicial activism by a federal agency to ensure that private
interests (the protection ofthe environment) were achieved.
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The EPA, like nearly every other executive agency, became a government co
opted interest group. As long as their professional lobbyists and the EPA were on the
job, environmentalists did not need to stay engaged in the debate and decision-making
process. In effect, environmentalists accepted public regulation as a substitute for civic
participation. According to Richard Harris and Sindey Milkis, the deregulation efforts of
the Reagan administration was a direct result not only of Reagan's larger philosophical
commitment to downsizing government, but also to the tactics and structure of the
environmental movement now virtually controlled by an executive agency and not
private citizens. "It was this involvement of public lobbyists in the courts and the
bureaucracy that many in the Reagan administration found obnoxious ... it seemed the
height of hypocrisy for public lobbyists to proclaim themselves tribunes of the people and
champions of participation, while fighting their greatest battles in the courts, the least
democratic branch" (Harris and Milkis, 1989:226). The Reagan administration was able
to cripple an executive agency achieving widely supported goals because the citizen
participation needed to prevent this action was absent. The system put in place by narrow
liberalism encourages this type of interest group pressure and reliance on public
regulation, which in tum can endanger the effective translation of popular will into
policy.
At this juncture a brief return to representation is necessary. The argument to be
made for a newfound emphasis on participation begs the question of what participation is
and how effectively it is translated into policy. At a most basic level, participation is
simply voting. But as stated previously, this does not ensure the designed representation
both in the assemblies and in the policy outputs. Some would argue that to be truly
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virtuous, participation must have a direct effect on policy. Otherwise, it has been diluted
in its power, and "the people" are a little less self-governed. While in a utopian setting
this argument might be logically posited, it cannot be a serious consideration in the
modern world.
As suggested by several authors, the Athenian model and universal assent can no
longer define participation. Participation, as a foundational characteristic of democracy,
now means the opportunity and ability to engage in debate. Each member of a society
must undertake the absolute necessity of discussing the issues of the day. As A.D.
Lindsay argued, "what matters is not that the final decision of government should be
assented to by every one, but that every one should have somehow made his contribution
to that decision" (Lindsay, 1997:362-3). It is the responsibility of the assembly to set the
agenda and provide a calming force to the volatile winds of public opinion, but without
free and open debate, assemblies can make no claim of continuous representation. In
modern society, we see the unmistakable breakdown in participation (debate, discussion,
and voting). Narrow liberalism has implanted a reliance on regulative bureaucracy to
ensure individual rights from government encroachment. The concern is two-fold. Under
a structure reliant on regulation and bureaucracy, how legitimate is the claim of self-rule?
Also as Lindsay points out, debate should lead to responsive representative assemblies.
Is this input occurring at all, and if it is, is the bureaucracy listening and responsive? In
reality, the regulative bureaucracy and the system are not responsive to the right kind of
input, which produces the formative ends of government, i.e. individual contributions to
the debate shaping the collective good. On the other hand, they are perhaps too
responsive to the narrow concerns of interest groups. Lindsay's pronouncement, "what
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matters is not that the people should rule, but that they think they should rule; and it has
given undue emphasis to the element of consent over the element of discussion" (Lindsay
359), now seems even more ominous in the face of a democracy purposefully put on
autopilot. The pursuit of individualism has allowed society to be deluded into thinking
regulative bureaucracy and interest groups can be substituted for the individual
participation contributing to the collective good that is necessary for the growth of
virtuous citizens.
Individualism and a reliance on regulative bureaucracy alone cannot advance
democracy and help our society develop the broader, community-based ends which are in
turn required for the production of virtuous citizens. "Democracy is a kind of community
government" (Cohen, 1997:357). This simple observation has not been advanced in the
narrow liberalism of the twentieth century, yet I maintain that community is the second
foundational product of self-government. If the goal of our society is to produce full and
complete virtuous citizens, attention must be given to the notion that we cannot act as if
our lives and actions affect no one but ourselves. It is an inescapable truth that we, as
Sandel terms it, are "encumbered." This fact is a strength not a weakness. Without
interpersonal contact and responsibility we cannot become complete human beings.
Long ago John Dewey noted this fact "The keynote of democracy as a way oflife
may be expressed as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in
the formation of values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from
the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human
beings as individuals," (Dewey, 1997:378). Two important elements can be found in the
above claim. First, it is absolutely essential" for the participation of every mature human
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being." Working with the above description of participation, the reason for its necessity
should become clear. Democracy as in all fonns of government establishes and enforces
community nonns and standards. Without individuals engaging and participating in our
government, it ceases to be our government; we cease to be self-ruled. As Dewey clearly
argued, "all those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing
and managing them" (Dewey, 1997: 378). "General social welfare" cannot be
detennined, let alone achieved, with a completely atomistic, self-interested view of the
individual. Ifwe understand "general social welfare" to be an aggregate of developing
complete and virtuous citizens, we must require consent by contribution and the
development of reason through debate, interaction and a widened understanding of those
around us. Self-interested consumers cannot achieve individual development as long as
they remain unengaged. In addition, society's commitment to freedom, equality, justice,
and virtue require input from the people. Even the narrow liberal's definition of "general
social welfare" cannot be achieved and protected without civic-minded individuals.
A brief discussion on ends versus means should be helpful to my point. Since
Hobbes, liberals have debated whether the goal of civil society should be the
development of shared ends or shared means. My contention is that shared means are
necessary but not sufficient. Democracy requires civic individuals engaged in their
community to develop consensus on shared means to individual development and
personal definitions of success. However, in the process, we also have at least one shared
end: the development of a virtuous society that allows for the growth of complete human
beings. Narrow liberalism's de-emphasis on civic meaning and the fonnative project has
put us in danger oflosing the recognition ofthis shared end.
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John Rawls discussed this process in tenns of concepts and conceptions (Rawls,
1971: 9-10). The goal of our democracy is to achieve a consensus on the concept of
justice. It is absolutely essential that a self-governed society actively engages in and
debates that concept continuously. This is due to the fact that each individual's
conception of those concepts ofjustice, freedom, toleration and equality changes and
develops over time. Conceptions are the necessary building blocks of concepts. Let's
consider the concept of fairness. There are many conceptions of fairness: the central
themes are equity versus efficiency. When individuals engage and debate the concept,
their conception changes. Eventually a new consensus of the concept of fairness is
achieved through changing conceptions. We, as a society, have grown and moved toward
our goal of more complete individuals. There are many defendable conceptions ofjustice
our society might share, but we are in danger of forgetting that we need to share a
consensus of the concept.
The challenge for our democracy is to find new and inventive ways to engender
and support civic-minded citizens without coercion or trampling the advances we have
made in our shared concepts of individual rights and freedoms. "Merely legal guarantees
of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of little avail if in
our daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences, is
choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred. These things destroy the
essential condition of the democratic way," (Dewey, 1997:382). Democracy is not
simply a structure established by our founding fathers that we can ignore and disengage
from in the pursuit of self-interested individualistic goals. The foundation of democracy
relies on the need for civic engagement and development. Without it, our development as
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complete human beings and a truly just and virtuous society is hampered. "The heart and
final guarantee of democracy is in the free gatherings of neighbors on the street comer to
discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in the gatherings
of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to converse freely with one
another," (Dewey, 1997:381-382). The challenge is to find new neighborhoods, new
street comers, new ways of engaging our citizens and engendering civic virtue.

IV. Liberalism's Tension Revisited
Traditional liberalism was composed of two elements. The first is that a new
conception of self-interested, rational individuals seeking their own personal ends shaped
an understanding of private freedom and autonomy. But in addition, liberalism accepted
and understood the need for participation and a sense of community and nation in order
to achieve and protect individual liberty. Holmes recognized this and has critiqued
modem liberalism as losing sight of this second element. In an attempt to find the path of
least resistance for the attainment of individual liberty, liberalism has narrowed its
definition of democracy and self-government. Narrow liberalism in its practical
application has transformed Holmes' envisioned two-fold regulative body, one that
included negative and positive constitutionalism. Narrow liberalism has redefined the
role of regulation to that of a disinterested, neutral structure ensuring individual freedom
and popular will without the need for costly dialogue at the community level. Narrow
liberalism is very efficient but it is a short-run, shortsighted efficiency. Mills'
hypothetical enlightened despot can be instituted according to liberals. But Mills'
original objection is still valid (Mills, 1991 :238-239). Twentieth century liberalism
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assumes and hopes regulative bureaucracy can replace participation as the "self' in self
government, and that the ends of government/or the people rather than by the people,
will be enough to create virtuous citizens. This is a naive and ultimately self-defeating
position. Without advancement and growth in all pillars of self-government and a
strengthening of all pillars of democracy, we as a society and as individuals cannot
develop beyond our current understandings and virtue. Essential to the goal of individual
development, is the relationship between engagement and participation, which establishes
consent by contribution and requires reason that promotes individual development.
Narrow liberalism relies on a neutral state to carry out the functions previously
required by civic participation. It requires a neutral state so that those in power cannot
abuse power. Not only is this naive; it is undesirable. Concepts such as toleration,
freedom, and fairness are not neutral; they are moral value judgments about what is
"right." A totally neutral state protecting and enforcing non-neutral values is impossible.
The focus on individual liberty, as modern liberalism has defined it, de-emphasizes and,
reduces civic virtue. Narrow liberalism presupposes a collective agreement on concepts
ofjustice and liberty. But if the debate over the concept ofjustice is robust (efficiency
versus equity), our debate over liberty is stalemated and stagnated by this system.
This is not to argue that a democratic government should not act as arbiter
between social groups and competing ideals. Some of democracy's surface
characteristics perform this function. Elections ensure channels to government and allow
competing voices to be heard. Commitments to freedom and equality provide protection
and allow minority groups to compete with the majority in free and open debate. Under
this structure, a majoritarian outcome ensures that a small but powerful social group, i.e.

23

•
elites, cannot impose their views. More to the central point, narrow liberalism has
focused on government's role as arbiter in order to expand individual's ability to focus
solely on their own interests.
As the case of Hungary in the late 1960s will demonstrate, this type of focus and
societal atmosphere can cause great setbacks for democracy's development. In 1968,
Hungarian leader Janos Kadar received Soviet approval for his "New Economic
Mechanism." Kadarism, as it came to be known, was a product of the politics of
liberalization. A society starting to organize and cry out for democracy was effectively
bought offby economic liberalization. A society convinced of atomistic, consumerist,
economic driven concepts of progress and success was bribed into abandoning any
dreams of democracy in return of some measure of market reforms. Kadarism, "kept
society in a diffuse and inarticulate state, in a childish dependence; it deprived people of
efficient institutions of interest intermediation and participation ... it liberalized people
without giving them rights and real freedom" (Hankiss, 1990:81). Democratic reforms
and development were delayed in Hungary for decades by a deluded understanding of
what freedom and democracy really meant.
Narrow liberalism's focus on the individual freedom pillar of self-government
has greatly affected the other two pillars. While incredibly responsive to the people as
organized interest groups, our regulative bureaucracy is now massive, pervasive,
intrusive and non-responsive or accountable to the people as individual contributors to
our public discourse. Our regulative bureaucracy allows for and promotes contributions
in the form of is routinized imposters parading massive money-making special interest
groups as new ways to engage in our public discourse. As a nation, America has seen its
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sense of community and civic engagement languish in the last quarter of the twentieth
century. The great gains of narrow liberalism should not be undone or attacked. They
are essential to our further development and represent great achievements for democracy.
However, just as important is a renewed sense of civic responsibility and engagement.
Our society and our government must redefine their roles and responsibilities. We must
embrace our newfound individual rights and freedoms, but we must also embrace the
challenge of finding new ways to produce civic meaning and engender participation if we
are to develop our democracy to the next level.

V. The Nature of Development
The term development requires some definition at this point. To develop means
to change, to redefine society and political culture, to broaden our understanding of
humanity and ourselves. The common concepts of what is just, fair, virtuous, and
morally desirable for individuals and society needs to be continually questioned. When a
society has successfully redefined Rawls' conceptions, then society has moved to a new
phase of development. The moment of development is not distinct. Phases do not come
in neat bundles, easily identifiable or set off by profound or cataclysmic events.
Development is a slow, incremental process. It is based on individual agency. Through
our life experiences, personal understandings and beliefs on rights and obligations, we
alter and refine our personal ideology. So too, this is the way for society. The aggregate
of each individual's ability to debate, discuss and experience new ideas and people allows
our society to slowly change its dominant understanding of our own political culture and
thus political development occurs.
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In Compliance Ideologies, Richard Wilson outlines an argument conceptualizing
political culture as ideology and on the development of democracy. A society's ideology
is the set of agreements and norms which maintain and stabilize its political environment.
Wilson terms his concept of political culture "compliance ideologies," due to this
stabilizing and maintaining effect. "A compliance ideology rests both on generalized
notions of what is morally acceptable and on regulations (customary or codified) that
translate what is acceptable into specific guides for action. The study of political culture,
as I use the term, is the study of compliance ideologies and the way they legitimize
systems of institutional control" (Wilson, 1992:24). Political culture reinforces and
legitimates the institutions which enforce a society's social contract.
Wilson centers his notion of political culture on "conceptual axes." These axes
are comprised of two components: cognitive and moral. Conceptual axes of compliance
ideologies represent the point at which two sides of individuals (and aggregately the
society's motivations and ultimately worldview) intersect. Wilson's cognitive axis
represents the rational, self-interested, economics driven model of motivation and
personal success. The moral axis represents the emotional, irrational, and often times
relational motivations of individuals. The point of intersection of these axes represents
the "compromise that is arrived at between the demands of the group and the needs of the
individuals is formulated in compliance ideologies as moral guidelines" (Wilson,
1992:82). Consonant with the approach assumed here, I will argue that over a period of
time, due to many factors rather than an earth-altering event, the conceptual axes shift
slowly and as they shift the political culture of a society shifts and development occurs.
This gradualist approach to development is directly tied to the previous discussion on
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concepts and conceptions. The consensus on our dominate concepts changes
incrementally individual to individual through open debate and contribution to structuring
society.
Wilson identifies four phases of development. The "archaic," or pre-state, phase
was dominated by kinship ties and fatalistic beliefs in warring gods. The shift to the
"traditional" phase was marked by three general trends: the development of monotheism,
the beginning of law, and the rise of world religions. Wilson also points to technological
advances that fundamentally changed the way people communicated and lived, such as
advances in agriculture, shipbuilding, advance methods of warfare, and elaboration of
writing techniques. A slow shift occurred in society's compromise of individual
freedoms and autonomy, as well as in their obligations and relation to the community
around them. This phase was characterized by a focus on stability and strict hierarchical
system. Solely the class structure and status determined an individual's rights and
responsibilities. Wilson identifies a catalyst that pushed society toward the third,
"modern" phase as the idea "that fairness requires like cases to be treated alike" (Wilson,
1992:70). The modern phase, which we are now in, has been dominated by property
relations. The compromise was structured around the competing view of rights as
property of equal individuals and rights as community property. Wilson's fourth phase,
emergent, has not yet arrived. Wilson hypothesizes it will be dominated by a new
evaluation of personal worth. Individuals will be measured by their ethical worth. The
dominance of property and a hierarchy will wane and society will develop to a new moral
high ground.

27

•
The importance of Wilson's stages here is his analysis of the modem phase and in
the process of change. For Wilson, the modem phase's reliance on property as a unifying
concept, a kind of common language, taints our advancement in individual freedoms and
liberties and prevents our development. I concur with this view in so much as I argue
society must remove economics from civics. Narrow liberalism has defined individual
freedom and morality solely in economic terms. The higher goal of creating virtuous
citizens has been swept aside in search of the almighty dollar. The narrow liberal
assumption that all humans act rationally and rights are merely property to hold and
control has created an atomistic, consumeristic society that lacks the civic culture
necessary to develop beyond our current compliance ideology.
To demonstrate my point further, let's consider the shift from the traditional to
the modem. The transition completed the establishment of democracy and the rule of
law. It advanced our understanding of toleration, fairness, equality and rights. The
change did not occur uniformly throughout the world, or even within a single country.
Regions and individuals still clung to the traditional system. But the dominant concepts
and agreements did indeed shift. As Wilson describes the process, "it proceeds at both
the individual and ideological level, slowly, interactively, incrementally, and
disjointedly" (Wilson 1992:75).
VI. Measuring Our Public Philosophy
An essential flaw in Wilson and most every other author's attempt to analyze and

discuss political culture and change is the lack of reliable empirical methods of
measurement. While I have advanced a normative argument it is also the goal of this
work to establish a new conception of political culture and infer new ways to measure
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change. This work has sought to establish a theoretical argument on the nature of our
public philosophy and the necessary steps for democracy's advancement. Much of this
debate has been centered around the abstraction of theories from anecdotes and contrived
notions of life as we experience it. To effectively claim a theory to be anything more
than this, a historical or empirical test must be administered. Amy McCready effectively
argues that both Rawls and Sandel's critique of Rawls, while advancing successfully our
understandings of the self and motivations, fall short of convincingly explaining the
world around us for this very reason. "Without a grounding in history or some sort of
empirical reality, Sandel's theory is subject to the same criticism that it launches at
liberalism-that a theory abstracted from specific situations and constructed of
conceptions only cannot justify itself or offer guidance to the world as it is" (McCready
1998:25). The next step is to determine that the problem as theory is really occurring
through the creation of an empirical test.
Many have attempted to conceptualize and empiricize political culture. The
theoretical argument presented above points to a new way to measure our political
culture. Determining what is culturally necessary for the foundations of democracy and
its development requires empirical measurement, analysis, and comparison over time. In
many cases, this question has been posed in terms of cultural support for democracy and
the measurements used, specifically voter registration and participation, have invariably
been found unreliable (Laitin, 1995). I seek to establish an agenda for the creation an
empirical test based on three indices as quantifications of the pillars of self-government,
(a civic ties index, a directive function index, and an individual liberties index) which,
when considered as a ratio, define political culture. These indices directly flow from the
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theoretical arguments made above and hopefully will be more successful at measuring
democracy's political culture because these measures stem from a more precise
theoretical understanding of what democracy produces and what it is founded upon.
An important clarification must be made at this point. The theoretical debate has

generally assumed a zero sum relationship between individual freedom and civic ties. I
do not agree with this empirical conceptualization. Sandel and the liberals he critiques
fall into the trap of zero sum arguments. It is not the case that as a society increases
individual freedoms, civic meaning must decrease. Instead, my argument points to a ratio
conception implied in Wilson's understanding of conceptual axes. He viewed the
relationship as a ratio between defining the rights of individuals and defining obligations
to the community. "Contractual obligations, which stress defined limits to authority, the
intrinsic value of the individual, and the legal guarantees regarding negotiating processes,
are paired, in some ratio, with positional obligations that stress mutuality, community
need, and an organic view of society" (Wilson, 1992:89). Much as Wilson understood
the compromise of these obligations to be the definition of the current "compliance
ideology," I shall define and argue that the ratio at which we find these three indices
defines empirically, our current political culture.
The three-part ratio, which would empiricize political culture, consists of a civic
ties index as the first ramification of the ratio. The civic ties index would measure the
side of the public philosophy de-emphasized by narrow liberalism, civic meaning. This
measure would attempt to index several different measures into one comparable point.
By plugging this value into a ratio we can measure its relative strength and importance in
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society. And we can also draw conclusions, one step removed, as to the effectiveness of
the current institutional and regulative structures' abilities to engender civic engagement.
Possible measures in the civic ties index seek to measure non-individual interest
based behavior. Tax morality, the level of citizens' timely payment oftaxes, can be seen
as a direct measure of their support for the regime and their commitment to any social
programs funded through their tax contributions. A useful tool in developing the civic
ties index would be a mass survey. A survey, while impossible to go back in time and
survey from the first two of Wilson's phases, would still be very useful for measuring
current attitudinal levels of support and engagement. This tool would provide researchers
with an individual measure which could be aggregated to the community and provide
clear evidence of community perceptions of civicness. Neighborhood action
associations, sports clubs, health clubs, social clubs, community action groups, corporate
community improvement initiatives could all be used to measure the amount of
individual involvement in non-government, private sector forms of participation and
community improvement. Measuring per capita charitable donations and hours of
volunteer work would also help to measure civic engagement. New forms of community
participation must also be identified, such as Internet chat groups and recycling levels.
The civic ties index seeks to accurately measure new wave forms of civic engagement.
Just as the challenge is to create new ways produce civic ties, our index must be able to
identify these mechanisms and their effects in order to paint an accurate picture of our
society's civicness.
The middle measure in the ratio is the directive function index. This index
represents a photo negative of the public regulation pillar of self-government. Instead of
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measuring bureaucratic power and insulation for the people, this index measures
variables more to the point of producing virtuous citizens. This means the ways in which
society and the institutional structures it creates promote and achieve debate and thus,
consent by contribution. By combining measures of both institutional mechanisms and
actual levels of direct citizen participation into a single index, a measure will be created
determining an exact level of both opportunity for and actual levels of popular directive
control over government action and policy, essentially the level of political contribution.
Including measures from each branch and level of government is essential in any
attempt to measure the true level of citizen direction and participation in their
government. Voter participation, while proven to be unreliable by itself as an indicator
of civic participation, must still be included in the directive function index. As a direct
measure of citizen engagement in self-government voting at all levels of government
cannot be ignored. Highly correlated to voting, but measuring citizens' ability and
propensity to have elements of direct democracy, would be measuring the frequency of
recalls, initiatives and referenda. The index must include whether or not these avenues of
recourse are available to citizens as well as their actual use of such mechanisms. This
variable would give a direct measure of citizens' willingness to dictate to or overrule the
legislative assemblies, elections of executives, and appointments ofjudges. Again this
measure requires data from all levels of government. As Putnam and others have
demonstrated, the number of free press operations and the level of newspaper
subscriptions provides an accurate measure of citizen political socialization and trigger
public debate on the issues ofthe day. As argued in the section on surface characteristic
of democracy, public debate is heard by those in power, and in an effective democracy,
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that debate directly affects policy well beyond Schumpeter's "throwing the bums out"
view of elections. Press operations and newspaper subscriptions are a measure of
society's interests in and thus participation in affecting government and public policy.
From the judicial standpoint, institutions such as trial by jury and grand jury
general statements provide citizens with a directive function over judicial precedence.
Measuring level of exceptions from jury duty and the frequency of grand jury general
statements could provide a more exact measure of directive action than a simple
dichotomous measure. A measurement of bureaucratic power and responsibility should
be included as a negative measure of directive action. Measuring budget levels, levels of
discretionary spending, percent of federal a state budgets supporting semi-autonomous
agencies, and number of persons employed by the government bureaucracy are all
possible ways to measure bureaucratic power and insulation from directive action. Some
form of this measure must be included to obtain an accurate picture of the true power of
directive actions. For this index, a mass survey needs to address issues of efficacy and
channels to government. This survey must be designed in such a way to avoid the
masking effects of narrow liberalism's view of procedural regulation as the will of the
people. Local governments' ability to tax citizens and develop their own spending
programs would also be a possible variable to include in this index. Assuming the
accuracy of the argument that local and state governments are "closer" to the people and
therefore more responsive, these governments' levels of autonomy, which is directly tied
to funding discretion, should provide another way in which to measure the strength of
directive actions. Again, identifying new ways to communicate with and affecting policy
makers is crucial to the accuracy of the index. These might include news ways of protest,

33

•

discussion, and debate or the evolution of old practices such as writing a letter to your
congressman, but now the index must include e-mail levels to congressional offices. By
indexing all these different aspects of directive action, it will be possible to compare this
phenomenon to the other sides of the ratio in an attempt to determine the state of our
political culture.
The third and final side to the ratio is the individual liberties index. As I have
argued, the focus and progress achieved by narrow liberalism has mainly come in this
arena. The United States has witnessed fundamental changes in the way individual
liberties are protected and an expansion of those liberties to virtually all sectors of our
population. A mass survey of citizens would provide an attitudinal foundation for the
index. Measuring peoples' opinions of not only their own rights, but also how they view
the rights of minority and marginalized sectors of our population provides an insight into
institutional and cultural successes. It will also point to areas that still require efforts to
overcome engrained cultural barriers to universal individual liberty protection. A simple
dichotomous coding ofbasic rights protected under the law would include freedom of
religion, speech, to a trial by jury, to petition the government, from unreasonable search
and seizure, and from cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees of habeas corpus.
Each of these freedoms connect to form the basic foundation of individual rights and
must be included. A way to measure the ongoing process of redefining liberties and
expanding the inclusion of marginalized sectors of the population would be to include
civil liberties minority rights legislative initiatives per legislative session. A key to this
index is the ability to measure the effectiveness and breadth ofthe enforcement of the
laws and structures and whether this enforcement is changing attitudes. The survey
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portion of the index should be able to tap into the change in attitudes or lack thereof, but I
am unable to detennine an accurate way to measure enforcement issues. This will be a
difficult challenge for the researcher who attempts to collect the data necessary for this
empirical analysis.
Narrow liberalism of the twentieth century has achieved great gains in the realm
of the individual liberty index, while only modest gains in the directive function index
have been achieved. Sandel would argue, and there is some evidence to support this
claim, that civic ties measures have actually diminished during this period. As a result,
we as a society have reverted to a less ideal fonn of government less capable of
producing virtuous citizens. This is implying a certain doomsday atmosphere to the
debate which I do not think the theory or the empirical evidence supports. Derek Bok's
1996 work, The State of the Nation, demonstrates the difficulties in measuring civicness
and the mixed empirical indicators. I expect to find similar results with indicators of
stagnation or at best a slight increase in measures of civic ties. This certainly does not
lead to cataclysmic foretelling of the destruction of self-government. In the context of
the discussion on development, this does point toward a transition period during which
the ratio is attempting to find a new equilibrium. The problems Sandel and others have
identified concerning the lack of growth in civic engagement and participation could be a
sign that this transition is taking place. Once one side of the ratio has increased i.e.
individual liberties, the other sides must find new ways to develop in the context of this
development. As stated previously, the challenge is to find new ways of engendering
civic engagement and the creation of new opportunities for participation in the context of
our new understandings of individual liberties. Wilson's emergent phase will be
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achieved when society's dominant conceptions have altered and redefined our concepts
and institutions in such a way that a new equilibrium between the three indices is
achieved that produces more virtuous citizens than before.

Conclusion
Narrow liberalism has triumphed in America for the last fifty years. As a society
we have achieved great procedural reforms and expanded our legal definitions of citizen,
intrinsic liberties, and public (government) responsibility. These great achievements
have not come without an honorable but deadly battle. The civil rights workers of the
1950s and 1960s endured the hardships of an intolerant South and a complacent nation.
Only after many thousands had protested and hundreds had died did we achieve
procedural reforms protecting minority voting rights and civil liberties. And thirty years
later, this country is still searching for an answer to our race relation problems. The
simple truth is that procedure does not change a society, black or white. Procedure and
institutions are tools. They are vehicles for the development of a society's public
philosophy. While procedural institutions are inescapable, they do not solely define
democracy.
The aim ofthis work was to set forth a normative argument as to the nature of our
political culture, which could lead researchers to a way of measuring our culture and find
ways to move beyond our current state. Stated simply, there are three pillars of
democracy: individual freedom, public regulation, and civic meaning. Narrow liberalism
of the last fifty years has focused on individual freedom using public regulation while
neglecting civic meaning. For democracy to develop, all three pillars must change, grow
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and become more adept in helping create virtuous citizens. If our aim is to produce free
and complete individuals then we require a government and a society, which engage in a
formative project. Civic meaning refers to an aggregate level notion of community,
nation, and state. But it also has an individual level reference, the idea that we are not
actors in a vacuum and that to be virtuous and complete, we have to contribute to the
greater good around us. This requires civic participation and engagement. Our
government and society are more virtuous when citizens use their own reasoning ability
to contribute to the society and thereby grant consent. This process of using one's
reasoning ability to contribute and by which a government establishes legitimacy and
virtue is essential for the individual as well. To develop individually, we must engage
and participate in the world around us, or we can never obtain the virtue we seek.
This is essentially a new political culture paradigm. Values are not separate from
institutions and incentives, but rather are essential components of political culture. While
I have not addressed this directly, it is important to note that I have assumed and implied
the interdependence of these actors throughout the work. In the end, I have constructed
and empirical conception of political culture. The construction is of a three-part ratio: a
civic ties index, a directive function index, and a individual liberties index. The
normative claims I have advanced are unsubstantiated. While anecdotes and historical
context have been used by Putnam, Sandel and others to further this claim, what is
lacking has been a successful empirical measure of political culture. I have set forth a
possible test to be used in determining the state of society's civicness and political culture
in general. While obviously untested more work along this line is essential.
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The greatest design task, that I foresee concerns the transitional period and how to
identify it. During a transition from one type of culture to another more than attitudes
and concepts change. Much of how we measure this change is through the institutions
that are created. Not knowing in advance what the emerging political culture wi11look
like, there will be high levels of contention as research point to new types of institutions
for evidence. Sandel and others like him who have correctly critiqued narrow liberalism,
must continue to be aware of new ways to measure the change around us so that we do
not miss it.
The equilibrium of public regulation, individual liberties and civic meaning is in a
state of transition. Narrow liberalism has achieved great strides in individual liberty but
the other pillars of democracy have been neglected. They are not crumbling; democracy
is not in danger of collapsing. The speed of development is the point of concern. A
period of transition has begun. The ratio, which defines our political culture, is searching
for a new equilibrium. The challenge is to find new ways and institutions to develop
civic meaning and put public regulation back in the hands of the citizens, while
maintaining the gains in individual liberties. The balance to be struck is one between
freedom and coercion, between the individual and community, between liberty and
cultural stagnation.
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